Hashtab windows 8.1
![hashtab windows 8.1 hashtab windows 8.1](https://www.vipkeys.net/01/md5/scr0802-1.png)
![hashtab windows 8.1 hashtab windows 8.1](https://wintorrents.ru/uploads/posts/2014-11/1415659447_1g70liq6gr8f0qoe.jpg)
![hashtab windows 8.1 hashtab windows 8.1](https://es.all81soft.com/images/upload/f/f/hashtab-windows-8.1-screenshot.jpg)
The reason it will not work is because the attacking host will not be able to use the PtH attack to obtain a Kerberos ticket. It will not work with Kerberos authentication.
#Hashtab windows 8.1 password
So in Windows-because password hashes are stored in a completely insecure manner (no salt, NTLM)-you have this vulnerability. You can disable the LMHASH via registry/GPOs (do it!) but you'll still get the hash stored as SHA-1 without a salt. By default-in Windows 7/8-it stores it using the old-school LMHASH (NTLM) alongside SHA-1. It also stores the user's password hash in the LSA. Instead Windows uses the LSA to store Kerberos tickets. On Windows you don't have the same kind of TGT cache. That's a very old problem and it's essentially a tradeoff for some convenience (you have to trust root anyway so why not?). If you let another user read that file they can impersonate you. The ticket cache is stored in /tmp and owned/readable only by the user that created it and root. On a Unix/Linux system, when you get a Kerberos ticket-granting-ticket cache (TGT) it is encrypted using a key that's assigned by the KDC when you perform a kinit (or when you authenticate if using pam_kerberos or GSSAPI with SSH and delegated auth). This is because this attack has nothing to do with Kerberos and everything to do with Windows' complete lack of security in regards to stored credentials. Whoah there: Single sign-on with Kerberos is still secure and will work just fine without being vulnerable to this pass-the-hash attack.